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1 
Analyzing the domestic and international    
conflict in Syria: Are there lessons from        
political science? 
 




This article contributes to the discussion about opportunities for 
and barriers to domestically-driven political reform in the Syri-
an Arab Republic. The argument is put forward in five sections. 
In the first section, relevant political science approaches ana-
lyzing the Syrian case from a domestic and global perspective 
are briefly discussed. The second section sketches the early po-
litical history of Syria between 1920 and 1970, while the third 
section explains how the regime led by Hafiz al-Assad was able 
to use the period after 1970 to consolidate Syrian statehood, 
establish a national security state, and emerge as a strong re-
gional geopolitical player. Section four analyzes the period of 
the Presidency of Bashar al-Assad before the current crisis 
(from 2000 until March 2011). Lastly, section five discusses 
the recent escalation of the Syrian domestic crisis toward the 
largest armed conflict in the country’s history. Section five also 
scrutinizes the domestic political reform program as advanced 
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by the Syrian government since April 2011 (essentially the new 
2012 Syrian constitution and the new multi-party system). A 
conclusion sums up both the theoretical and empirical argu-
ments.  
 
1. Theoretical approaches to the study of Syria 
In the study of Syrian affairs, domestic and international levels 
of analysis must be jointly considered. The most promising an-
alytical approaches deriving from political science can be di-
vided into those that highlight specific Syrian issues and those 
that focus on Syria in the context of the regional and interna-
tional system. Five approaches appear to offer the highest ana-
lytical utility, moving in order of their analytical scope from a 
particular consideration of Syria toward those that are of more 
general applicability: (1) the theory of populist authoritarian-
ism; (2) the focus on sectarian loyalties and weak nation-
hood/statehood; (3) analysis of the postcolonial ‘rentier state’ 
based on oil and other resource incomes and of the ‘state class’ 
that emerges in the context of the political economy of a rentier 
economy to advance autonomous social interests; (4) the neo-
Gramscian approach in international relations theory that 
stresses transnational social class conflict; and (5) classical ge-
opolitical analysis in the tradition of realist international rela-
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tions theory. The remainder of this section briefly deals with 
each of these analytical approaches in turn.  
First, the theory of populist authoritarianism explains 
the development of the modern Syrian state since the country’s 
independence in 1946 as resulting from the mobilization of 
popular social classes challenging and defeating the ancient 
regime. After the withdrawal of the French colonial power 
from Syria, the postcolonial state between 1946 and 1963 ini-
tially ‘acted as a mere executive committee of the landed com-
mercial ruling class’ (Khatib 2011: 60). This changed, 
however, with the emergence of populist authoritarianism 
based on the political mobilization of new middle classes and 
the peasantry. The Baath Party became the mobilizing factor 
after defeating competing political forces such as the Syrian 
Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) and the Syrian Communist 
Party (SCP) in the battle for dominance of the Syrian army’s 
officer corps (Seale 1988: ch. 5-6). The Syrian army in turn 
provided power and authority to take over and transform the 
old state. Thus, the theory of populist authoritarianism suggests 
that the Baath Party engaged in the controlled mobilization of 
popular social forces ‘from above’ to enforce social change 
such as the removal of the traditional bourgeoisie from political 
power and the advancement of social reforms favoring the 
popular social classes (Hinnebusch 2001).  
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The most significant achievements of populist authori-
tarianism are land reform (the distribution of land to popular 
sectors in the countryside) and the transformation of the state 
by way of expansion of a new public sector that owes its access 
to resources and upward social mobility exclusively to the new 
political regime. However, during the historical period of the 
so-called ‘neo-Baath’ between 1966 and 1970 when Salah 
Jadid chaired the regime the Syrian version of populist authori-
tarianism lacked stability and showed signs of political ‘adven-
turism’. The focus of Jadid on radical social change worked to 
limit the appeal of the Baath Party. Only after Jadid’s removal 
by Hafiz al-Assad in 1970 did populist authoritarianism stabi-
lize—thanks to the creation of a more comprehensive political 
alliance. In particular, Hafiz al-Assad invited some sectors of 
the traditional bourgeoisie to re-join the regime while corporat-
ist political bodies such as peasant organizations, unions and 
other mass membership bodies were built up in parallel. Over-
all, the radicalism of social transformation was downscaled. 
Moreover, the rapid emergence of Syria as a rentier state based 
on the exploitation of national oil resources in the 1970s and 
1980s allowed further expansion of the public sector and lim-
ited industrialization while political and strategic rents (espe-
cially Syria’s alliance with the Soviet Union) allowed the 
regime to engage in the construction of a national security 
Lessons from Political Science. 
 5 
state. In the 1990s, the populist authoritarian regime entered a 
structural crisis due to the stagnation and decline of oil reve-
nues. This triggered a still ongoing crisis of direction since the 
regime now faced the choice between neoliberal economic re-
form policies based on a shift toward the new domestic bour-
geoisie and international capital, and alternative efforts to 
sustain the alliance between the state and popular sectors. With 
respect to the latter option, the rentier state in crisis suffered 
from permanent resource shortages that made it difficult to 
maintain existing patronage or to offer any further concessions 
to the popular sectors. 
A second theoretical perspective on Syria focuses on 
sectarianism (Dam 2011a). This line of analysis suggests that 
the structures of the Syrian state are ultimately controlled by 
some members of the Alawi minority sect ruling the country in 
an informal coalition with other minorities such as Christians 
and Druzes. On the one hand, the coalition of minorities selec-
tively co-opts representatives of the Sunni majority into the rul-
ing bloc. On the other hand, the state’s repressive forces, such 
as special army units and the security services, remain mostly 
controlled by sectarian loyalties. Other potential sources of 
state authority, such as ideology or social class coalitions, are 
less significant by comparison. In summary, the proponents of 
this interpretation of the Syrian state suggest that past conflict 
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over power in the Baath Party and the army took an apparently 
ideological form but was actually decided along sectarian lines. 
Thus, the rise to power of Hafiz al-Assad and the setting-up of 
cohesive state structures since 1970, at least in comparison to 
the earlier period between 1946 and 1970, is held to be the re-
sult of tight linkages within the ruling elite that were conse-
quences of the extraordinary cohesion of at least some sectors 
of the Alawi community backing up his rule.2  
An extension of this interpretation is the perception that 
Syria is not a nation state and that the current crisis will result, 
ultimately, in the splitting-up of the country. The proponents of 
this view suggest that ‘state nationalism’ in Syria has failed and 
that the division of Syria along sectarian and ethnic lines into 
smaller Sunni, Alawi and potentially Kurdish and Druze enti-
ties should be expected. What speaks against this excessively 
ethnic and sectarian interpretation of Syria is that all postcolo-
nial states in the region are ‘state nations’ rather than ‘nation 
states’ (Breuilly 1993). Moreover, the break-up of any Arab 
state in the region would certainly trigger intervention from 
outside and would have repercussions far beyond the borders of 
Syria. In summary, the populist authoritarian and the sectarian 
perspective both help to explain certain features of the Syrian 
state. However, it is not useful to place any single perspective 
above the other since ‘it becomes almost impossible to disen-
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tangle the sectarian argument from the political economy one’ 
(Khatib 2011: 59). 
Third, more general theories of economic development 
might also be useful to acquire a better understanding of the 
nature of the Syrian state. In this context, the most promising 
expansion on the theory of populist authoritarianism in Syria 
toward a general theoretical framework is provided by the theo-
ry of the rentier state and state class (Elsenhans 1981). In de-
veloping countries, capital accumulation in the domestic 
market is either missing or very limited in scope and the state 
lacks the capacity to enforce an effective tax system. Yet as 
soon as developing countries are in a position to exploit natural 
resources on a large scale and sell them to the outside world, 
state revenue no longer needs to be primarily generated domes-
tically. Thus, in oil-producing countries the relationship be-
tween the state and the economy is reversed because state 
income determines gross domestic product and not the other 
way round (Luciani 1987: 65). Moreover, the direct appropria-
tion of rent income by the state means that the bureaucracy 
does not need to ‘legitimize their resource control in their inter-
action with other social classes, which results in the creation of 
a specific class—the state class’ (Eckelt 2011a: 19).3  
According to Elsenhans, the state class consists of all 
those employed in ‘leading roles in the state apparatus, state 
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enterprise, and state-led political and societal organizations’ 
(1981: 122). This class includes the higher levels of the state 
bureaucracy, state enterprise, army, and similar state-led bodies 
that enjoy higher than average incomes, prestige, and opportu-
nities for political participation. Crucially, the state class is an 
elite class that differs from rank-and-file public sector employ-
ees. The latter are clients rather than members of the state 
class.4 The ruling segments of the state class tend to co-opt the 
most significant other social classes in society utilizing the con-
trol of rent income to construct networks of patronage. In this 
context, corporatist institutions are brought in to avoid the open 
escalation of political conflict: ‘The relationship of the state to 
different social classes is not revealed in tax policy but in social 
policy…. [T]he state class legitimates itself in competition with 
other segments by improving the conditions of living of the 
population at large’ (ibid.: 270). The historical task of a state 
class is to organize a transition process, from simply apportion-
ing the rent between different groups (the initial stage) to pro-
ductively and intelligently utilizing resource income in the 
service of national economic development. In case of success, 
states might use local agricultural surplus together with re-
source income to finance industrialization efforts and subse-
quently engage in export-oriented industrial policies to advance 
the position of the country in the international division of labor 
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(Elsenhans 2005: 163-164). In the Syrian case the transition 
toward the productive usage of resource income remains deeply 
contested. In particular, Syrian oil revenues were rather limited 
in comparison to those of the main OPEC producers and as 
measured in terms of resource endowment per head of the pop-
ulation. In the academic literature, it is often suggested that at 
least 40 percent of state income must derive from oil revenues 
to define a rentier state, and Syria has frequently received less 
(Basedau and Lay 2009). What was available was used to sub-
sidize all kinds of domestic economic activity, including agri-
culture, while a large share was also spent on Syria’s national 
security. Thus, rentier state theory must be conceptualized ra-
ther broadly: oil and gas revenues are only one of the potential 
sources of income for the state class while strategic and politi-
cal rents must also be considered to explain the room for ma-
neuvering to sustain patron-client relationships domestically.5 
In conclusion, the theory of the rentier state might highlight 
some of the underpinnings of the behavior of the Syrian state 
class that are shared with many other countries. It also helps to 
explain why the extent of the remainder of the Syrian resource 
endowment (its expected value and the right of accessing it) is 
a crucial political variable.  
The fourth theoretical school worth considering in the 
context of Syrian affairs is the neo-Gramscian perspective to 
10    Contextualizing the Syrian Uprising 
 10 
international relations (Cox 1983). This theoretical approach 
goes beyond the traditional focus on states as the main actors in 
international relations and focuses instead on the interaction 
between economic regimes and transnational social classes. 
The main focus is with social class forces and their political 
agency in contesting for leadership and hegemony at the na-
tional and international level. Resulting transnational dominant 
policy frameworks are considered to reflect a combination of 
state and class power. For example, the so-called ‘embedded 
liberalism’ of the Cold War era after 1945 and the more recent 
emergence of neoliberal capitalism since the mid-1970s are ac-
cording to neo-Gramscian analysis due to elite consensus that 
emerged only after a period of severe crisis and class conflict 
(e.g. the rise of leaders such as Reagan and Thatcher focused 
on the exclusion of organized labor from policy formulation at 
the national level). Within this approach, hegemony might oc-
casionally be based on cross-class alliances, such as occurred 
with the political co-option of social democratic parties and 
trade union movements during the period of Cold War liberal-
ism. At other times, however, hegemony might be based on 
more narrow elite coalitions, such as occurred during the most 
recent period of the apparent dominance of finance capital over 
other class forces (the so-called ‘shareholder capitalism’ since 
the 1990s). In this respect, contestation between advocates of 
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social reformist and neoliberal policies inside of international 
organizations is one of the principle determinants of the rise 
and fall of hegemonic political ideas in the international system 
(Hudson 2005).  
In the case of Syria, the state elite maintained a strategy 
of maximizing its own autonomy vis-a-vis international organi-
zations until the 1990s. In marked contrast to many other de-
veloping countries that suffered from the debt crisis of the 
1980s and 1990s, Syria enjoyed relative prosperity due to its 
self-sufficiency in agriculture and the absence of a debt record 
with western countries or western-dominated IOs such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the World Bank. The 
country did not, therefore, engage in IMF-inspired structural 
adjustment programs—although some of the domestic austerity 
measures that were taken in the 1990s as a result of the end of 
Soviet assistance and the decline of income from oil exports 
triggered very similar social consequences for the poorest sec-
tions of the population. Under Bashar al-Assad, the country’s 
leadership started to experiment with a more accommodating 
policy framework in the context of neoliberal capitalism. The 
former (2003-2011) Syrian deputy prime minister for economic 
affairs Abdullah al-Dardari was the most prominent representa-
tive of supply-side neoliberal reform policies in Syria. In line 
with World Bank advice, he focused on cuts in subsidies for 
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agricultural producers, removal of tariff protection, and the 
raising of domestic prices of subsidized commodities such as 
gas and fuel. These measures might be interpreted as Syria’s 
increasing acceptance of the international neoliberal economic 
doctrine. They certainly worked to weaken the Syrian corporat-
ist institutions that had previously expressed interest mediation 
and social compromise at the domestic level (Hinnebusch 
2012). Nevertheless, proper interpretation of neo-Gramscian 
theory suggests that Syria remains characterized by the political 
control of most economic policies, a core feature of rentier 
states. Accordingly, the regime still navigates between the 
forces of economic liberalization representing private capital at 
the domestic and international level, on the one hand, and the 
‘corrective wing’ representing the Syrian public sector and 
popular forces on the other hand. 
The fifth theoretical perspective on Syria is provided by 
classical geopolitical analysis which focuses on the influence of 
geographical factors on the conduct of politics and international 
relations. In the context of the modern Middle East, the efforts 
of the United States (U.S.) to assume the role of the only veto 
power in the conduct of Arab regional politics structures the 
behavior of all competing powers. The U.S. policy of enforcing 
and defending a veto role derives from the takeover of formerly 
European (i.e. British and French) influence in the region after 
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WWII. In this respect, the most significant single step was the 
1944 agreement between U.S. President Roosevelt and the 
Saudi King Ibn Saud that established a close strategic alliance 
between the two countries. Afterwards, the U.S. largely re-
placed British and French influence in the region, leaving the 
latter powers only token representation—for example the con-
nection between Maronite Christians in Lebanon and France 
and the linkage between the Jordanian monarchy and Britain. 
U.S. strategists described the agreement with the Saudi King, 
which allowed U.S. companies access to Saudi oil fields, as ‘a 
stupendous source of strategic power, and one of the greatest 
material prizes in world history’ (Merriam 1945, quoted in 
Gendzier 2011, footnote 3).  
The U.S. regional policy of exclusive strategic leader-
ship was formalized in the Eisenhower Doctrine, which consid-
ered any intervention of competing powers in the Middle East 
as unacceptable. In addition, the U.S. took over the role of 
France as military patron of Israel in the late 1950s. Direct U.S. 
military intervention in Lebanon in 1958 further underlined the 
geopolitical decline of France in the region.6 The U.S. subse-
quently faced significant geopolitical backlash due to the chal-
lenge of Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser who managed to 
politically defeat the joint Franco-British and Israeli invasion 
during the Suez Canal crisis in 1956 by tactical alignment with 
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the U.S. before shifting Egypt toward an alliance with the So-
viet Union (Haykal 1973; Yaqub 2004: 5-8, 20). This U.S. de-
feat in Egypt was ultimately reversed after Nasser’s death; but 
the U.S. once again lost control of a significant regional ally 
when the Shah of Iran was removed from power during the Ira-
nian revolution of 1979. From the Syrian point of view, the lo-
cal geopolitics offered Syria the position of a ‘swing state’ in 
regional geopolitical affairs, which allowed the country to 
choose alliances with each of the other three main regional Ar-
ab powers, namely Egypt, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia (Yaqub 2004: 
36). Syria first aligned with Egypt under Nasser but the U.S. in 
effect broke this link in the early 1970s after Nasser’s death. In 
reaction to its isolation in the Arab world, Syria subsequently 
formed a defensive alliance with the Islamic Republic of Iran (a 
non-Arab power) after the 1979 Iranian revolution and subse-
quently with the Shiite Hizballah party in Lebanon in the 
1980s.  
This alliance (the so-called ‘axis of resistance’) has 
gained additional significance due to the economic and political 
rise of Russia and especially China. In particular, China’s re-
cent interest in Middle Eastern oil resources—necessary for 
energy-poor China to maintain its industrialization drive and 
high growth rates—is a main factor to explain U.S. conduct in 
the region (Almond 2003; Brzezinski 1997: 55). As for Syria, 
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the country’s leadership tried at least twice in the 1990’s to im-
prove relations with the U.S. In this context, Hafiz al-Assad 
engaged in sustained negotiations with George H. W. Bush 
during the time of the second Gulf war in 1991 and with Bill 
Clinton in the context of the Madrid ‘peace process’ in the mid-
1990s (Gani 2011: 241-245). In both cases, the Syrian leader-
ship learned that elite diplomacy did not result in the willing-
ness of U.S. policymakers to support legitimate Syrian 
demands, especially the return of the Israeli-occupied Golan 
Heights to Syria. In summary, the behavior of the government 
of Bashar al-Assad since 2000 and the strong focus on the re-
gional and international alliances between the Syrian govern-
ment and supportive external powers (Iran, Russia, and China) 
is due to long-standing experiences with U.S. behavior in the 
region. 
Only by combining different theoretical perspectives—
focusing on the structure of material interests, social forces, 
and ethnic divides on the one hand, and the awareness of the 
interaction between Syrian domestic forces and the regional 
and international system on the other, is it possible to capture 
the complexities of Syrian politics. In fact, the resilience of the 
Syrian state under pressure since March 2011 has underlined 
that the regime continues to be deeply rooted in Syrian society. 
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2. Syria’s political history from 1920 until 1970 
The history of modern Syria derives from the division of the 
Levant region, known as the Bilad al-Sham during Ottoman 
times (Arabic for ‘the country of Syria’), after the break-up of 
the Ottoman Empire in 1918 into smaller states. These new 
state entities were given as ‘mandates’ of the League of Na-
tions system to Britain and France. This decision was the direct 
result of the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement in 1916, named af-
ter a British and a French diplomat, in which the Levant region 
had been divided into a British and French zone of interest (see 
BBC 2001 for a map; WWI Archive (no stated date) for the full 
text). During the subsequent French rule in Syria and Lebanon 
(1920-1946 in the former and 1920-1943 in the latter case), the 
French authorities focused heavily on ‘divide-and-rule’ policies 
along ethnic and religious lines. First, the French severed Leb-
anon from Syrian territory and created a ‘Greater Lebanon’ by 
adding territory east of Mount Lebanon to the new state entity. 
This decision created a demographic balance between Maronite 
Christians and Sunni and Shiite Muslims, thereby bringing into 
being a territorial state in which ‘most Lebanese owed their 
primary allegiance not to the nation but to their religious sects’ 
(Yaqub 2004: 37).  
Similar considerations governed French rule in the re-
mainder of the Syrian mandate. Here, the French aligned them-
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selves with the Alawi and Druze minorities. These groups were 
given priority in being drafted into the French colonial armed 
forces, the troupes specials. French strategists were keen to ex-
periment with a ‘canton’-like system of subdividing Syrian ter-
ritory. Therefore, they delegated authority to various local 
leaders in order to create a power balance based on sectarian 
and regional divisions. This was supposed to limit the appeal of 
the emerging predominantly Sunni Muslim Arab nationalist 
movement which demanded Syria’s independence from France 
and considered the separation of Lebanon from Syria as an arti-
ficial construct. In 1938, the Turkish military entered the Syri-
an province of Alexandretta (the northern Mediterranean 
coastal area of Syria) and expelled sections of the local Arab 
and Armenian population. The territory was subsequently in-
corporated into Turkey as the 63rd Turkish Hatay province. 
This annexation of Syrian territory was agreed by the French 
colonial authorities to improve relations with Kemalist Turkey 
but post-independence Syria has contested the decision ever 
since.  
While the British and French wished for small political 
entities to exercise effective control, the emerging pan-Arab 
nationalist movement stressed the unity of the Arab nation. Ar-
ab nationalism became defined as being based on the shared 
use of the Arab language rather than the territorial unity of the 
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Arab peninsula. It was as a result of this shift toward cultural 
nationalism that Egypt and the countries of the Maghreb started 
to be associated with pan-Arab nationalist aspirations (Devlin 
1991). When Syria became independent in 1946, the state was 
exceptionally fragile. In marked contrast to Lebanon, in which 
a ‘National Pact’ of 1943 between the Sunni Muslim politician 
Riad el-Solh and the Maronite Christian politician Bishara al-
Khouri allowed the construction of a political regime based on 
power sharing between different sects (Seale 2011), no such 
formal agreement was reached between the various sects in 
Syria. As a result, postcolonial politics remained in the hands 
of traditional notables and the landed gentry. In addition, re-
gional divisions within Syria, such as the conflict between Da-
mascus and Aleppo-based political leaders, together with the 
exclusion of popular sectors from effective participation in pol-
itics, made the postcolonial Syrian state a rather weak entity. 
Between 1946 and 1963, Syria found itself largely at the 
receiving end of regional and global power politics, and it fre-
quently suffered covered US and neighboring Arab countries’ 
interference in its domestic affairs (Copeland 1970; Seale 1986; 
Rathmell 1995: 138-144, 163-166; Dostal 2014). In the politi-
cal science literature of the time, Syria was presented as ‘the 
coup country par excellence’, having experienced more than a 
dozen military coups since independence (Luttwak 1979 [first 
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edition 1968]: 85). Because of weak statehood, the Syrian army 
quickly emerged as the single-most effective tool to exercise 
political power. Since the army had been historically consid-
ered an unacceptable career choice for members of Syria’s tra-
ditional upper classes, it was young officers from the lower and 
lower-middle-classes and from the ethnic minorities who 
gained positions that would allow them subsequently to com-
pete for state power (Seale 1988: 38-39).  
Alongside the rise in influence of the army, Syrian poli-
tics in the 1950s was also characterized by the emergence of 
new political parties that aligned themselves with ideologies of 
popular sectors. The three most significant forces were the 
Baath Party, the SSNP, and the Communists (SCP). Their ideo-
logical differences concerned questions of pan-Arab unity and 
the issue of socialism— the Baath Party was ideologically 
committed to pan-Arab unity, while the SSNP, led by the 
Greek-Orthodox Antun Saadeh, insisted that a greater Syrian 
nationalism should unite a ‘fertile crescent’ reaching from Cy-
prus and Lebanon via Syria to Iraq into a single state based on 
a shared cultural heritage that was declared to be substantially 
different from other Arabs. According to the SSNP, this would 
allow the founding of a greater Syria. As for the question of 
socialism, the Baath declared itself committed to ‘unity, free-
dom, and socialism’ but rejected Marxist theories. The SSNP 
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of the 1950s was originally non-leftist in its discourse but later 
became more social-populist, while the Communists essentially 
followed the Soviet Union’s leadership but still suffered inter-
nal divisions over the question of its relationship with the Baath 
Party.  
The Arab nationalism of the Baath Party, founded by 
the Orthodox Christian Michel Aflaq (1910-1989) and the Sun-
ni Muslim Salah al-Din al-Bitar (1912-1980), was based on a 
demand to unite all Arabs, defined in terms of shared language 
and culture, into a single Arab state. In the beginning, the party 
aspired to develop branches in all Arab countries, and the par-
ty’s leadership was therefore divided into a so-called ‘national 
command’ (a pan-Arab leadership structure that was notionally 
in charge of the entire party) and a ‘regional command’ (the 
leadership structure dealing with Syrian affairs).7 However, 
following the rise of Nasser in Egypt and of a subsequent pan-
Arab Nasserist movement, the historical Baath Party leadership 
around Aflaq decided to accept Nasser’s leadership role. The 
party was subsequently dissolved to prepare for the unification 
of Egypt and Syria during the United Arab Republic (pro-
claimed in 1958 and dissolved by the exit of Syria in 1961). 
Following the failure of this short-term political experiment 
with Arab unity, the historical leaders of the Baath Party lost 
most of their former influence.  
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The party was now increasingly controlled by a military 
committee of Syrian army officers that included Hafiz al-
Assad. This group took power in Syria in a coup on March 8, 
1963. Another coup on February 23, 1966, consolidated the rise 
of the so-called ‘neo-Baath’ and further sidelined the older 
Baath leadership. The 1966 coup, in particular, resulted in the 
rise to power of a collective body of Baathist army officers led 
by Salah Jadid that was mostly Alawi in origin and in which 
Hafiz Al-Assad served as defense minister. Under Jadid’s lead-
ership, the Baath Party adopted a leftist profile and engaged in 
land reform confiscating land from large landowners. This 
move was backed up by the foundation of the Peasants’ Union 
in 1964 that became a pillar of Baathist influence in the coun-
tryside (Eckelt 2011a: 30-31). As for Arab affairs, the Jadid 
leadership promoted engagement in a ‘people’s war’ to liberate 
Palestine, and it was willing to offer Palestinian militants mili-
tary support in their conflict with the Jordanian state authori-
ties. However, this alliance was not strong enough to prevent 
the military defeat of Egypt and Syria in the 1967 war with Is-
rael and the loss of the strategically and economically signifi-
cant Golan Heights that have since been occupied by Israel.  
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3. The Presidency of Hafiz al-Assad (1970/1971-2000)8 
On November 16, 1970, Hafiz al-Assad led another coup—
termed the ‘Corrective Movement’—that removed the more 
radical sections of the Baath Party under the leadership of Jadid 
from power. This turned out to constitute a decisive turning 
point in the history of modern Syria. In marked contrast to ear-
lier Baathist leaders, Hafiz al-Assad was able to construct a 
stable political system that allowed the Syrian state for the first 
time to become an influential regional player. In order to ex-
plain this transformation of state and society, economic and 
political factors must be jointly considered. In economic terms, 
Syria started to take off as a rentier state in the early 1970s 
thanks to the expansion of oil rents and strategic and political 
rents. These derived in turn from rising oil prices and improved 
relations with richer Arab Gulf countries, thereby allowing for 
the rapid expansion of the Syrian public sector.9 Subsequently, 
public sector workers enjoyed privileged access to social poli-
cies such as guaranteed jobs, free health care, old-age pensions, 
public transport, social services, and some public housing facil-
ities (Eckelt 2011a: 60). In addition, the state controlled prices 
of basic goods such as fuel, petrol, bread, and certain staple 
foods. In the countryside, oil revenues were utilized to provide 
price guarantees for agricultural producers that allowed rural 
workers to participate in the rise in the standard of living. 
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Overall, the 1970s were characterized by rapid urbanization 
and a transition in the labor market. At the beginning of the 
decade, one in two Syrians was working in agriculture while 
only one in four did so at the beginning of the 1980s (Eckelt 
2011a: Apendix IV). 
In terms of Hafiz al-Assad’s reorganization of the polit-
ical system in Syria, a marked shift took place toward a ‘pal-
ace-type’ of political authority that replaced the earlier system 
of collective leadership. The new system was characterized by 
the dominance of the president, who alone assumed the posi-
tion of controller of all other institutions. Here, Assad was 
probably inspired by the example of Nasser in Egypt who had 
been very successful in stabilizing his rule by engaging in role 
distribution to other major officials while reserving to himself 
the exclusive right of political coordination (Baroutt 2011: 12). 
Under the new presidential system, the Syrian state became de-
fined by the following major institutions: (1) the president, who 
is in charge of the ‘Presidency of the Syrian Arab Republic’, 
which has purposefully blurred boundaries; (2) the army; (3) 
the security services, which operate independently from each 
other and without any inter-agency coordination; (4) the formal 
state institutions consisting of a government and ministries 
headed by a prime minister and assisted by a parliament (the 
People’s Assembly)10; and (5) the regime’s corporatist institu-
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tions such as the Baath Party, the other legal political parties 
organized in the ‘National Progressive Front’ (NPF), founded 
in 1972, as well as the Peasants’ Union, trade unions, and simi-
lar bodies.  
Thus, the most significant feature of the Syrian political 
system is the concentration of power in the Presidency. The 
Syrian president is the commander in chief of the armed forces, 
controls the security services, and has also been the secretary 
general of the Baath Party. While the political domination of 
the president was codified in the 1973 Syrian constitution, it is 
significant to appreciate that the office is characterized by for-
mal and informal powers: ‘The president can govern by way of 
ordinances and decrees and has the right to initiate laws in Par-
liament. The government and the 14 provincial governors are 
appointed by the president and directly responsible to him. The 
government consists of a prime minister and a variable number 
of ministers. [O]pportunities of the president to intervene di-
rectly into day-to-day policymaking are not based on well-
defined presidential institutions. Instead, decisions are taken on 
the basis of consultations with advisors and ad-hoc working 
groups’ (Eckelt 2011a: 55). It follows that the Syrian president 
is free to shape the office according to his own interests: direct 
leadership can be exercised whenever suitable, while authority 
can also be delegated at will to other people who own their po-
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sition directly to the president. Indeed, Hafiz al-Assad decided 
to focus his attention on foreign policymaking and defense 
while delegating the management of Syria’s economy and other 
domestic issues to close assistants. He explained his choices by 
stating that ‘I am the head of the country, not of the govern-
ment’ (Assad, quoted in Seale 1988: 343).  
In terms of the actual exercise of power, observers of 
Syrian affairs have pointed out that the informal security appa-
ratus, based largely on sectarian loyalties and directly answera-
ble to the president, backs up the formal state institutions. 
Thus, many state offices act as little more than a facade for the 
actual power holders. In other words, Syria’s official govern-
ment is one component of the Syrian regime, but it does not 
necessarily belong to the core of the power elite. In addition, 
the different formal and informal institutions mutually overlap 
and reinforce each other. For example, the army enjoys privi-
leged representation in the leadership of the Baath Party that is, 
in turn, based on a hierarchy consulting with the president in 
his role as party leader. Until the 2012 amendment of the Syri-
an constitution (further discussed below), the Baath Party was 
the ‘leading party in the society and the state’ (article 8 of the 
1973 Syrian constitution), and it was charged with the running 
of public sector institutions in the economic and educational 
field and in the army. In summary, the exceptionally strong role 
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of the Syrian president makes it practically impossible for the 
other formal institutions to exercise checks and balances or to 
issue vetoes with respect to presidential actions.  
Briefly summing up the main events during the long 
rule of Hafiz al-Assad, economic affairs were determined by 
increasing access to oil revenues and political and strategic 
rents. Such resources could be used according to political ob-
jectives and spending focused on the army and the public sec-
tor. The main problem of managing state budgets was, 
however, that oil revenues fell with the decline of oil prices that 
started in the 1980s, while the political and strategic rents were 
also highly unstable and depended on Syria’s geopolitical envi-
ronment. Thus, Syria enjoyed periods in which the rich Arab 
Gulf states were willing to provide assistance to the Syrian 
state, such as after the 1973 war with Israel, but suffered uncer-
tainty too, as such political and strategic rents could disappear 
at short notice. In addition, the Syrian leadership received sub-
stantial economic and military assistance from the Soviet Un-
ion before and, more substantially, after the 1973 war in order 
to support the Syrian doctrine of ‘strategic parity’ with Israel in 
the military field. (Although the Syrian army subsequently de-
veloped into one of the strongest regional armies, the Syrian 
economic foundations were never strong enough to allow 
reaching the goal of strategic parity.) 
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In terms of managing the Syrian domestic economy, 
Assad started his Presidency in 1971 by trying to establish bet-
ter relations with the representatives of the traditional urban 
Sunni bourgeoisie. During the entire period of his rule until 
2000, economic policymaking shifted between the poles of in-
creased economic liberalization, as advocated by representa-
tives of the traditional and new (regime-dependent) 
bourgeoisie, and ‘corrective measures’ to support the public 
sector, as demanded by the statist Baathists. This triggered cy-
clical competition: whenever the rent income of the state de-
clined, the economic liberalization wing advanced while the 
statist Baathists reasserted their position when rent income was 
on the increase. It is plausible to argue that this helped to ‘con-
tain both the right and left mechanisms of the political regime. 
Thus it achieved a sharing of power and managed the various 
stances emanating from within the regime’ (Baroutt 2011: 13).  
Over time, this process resulted in the increased power 
of the liberalizers. Various political turning points in favor of 
the liberalizing wing can be pointed out. For example, the first 
‘infitah’ (Arab term for ‘openness’) after the accession to pow-
er of Hafiz al-Assad in the early 1970s, and the second ‘infitah’ 
based on the Investment Law no. 10 of 1991, were certainly 
significant stepping stones in moving ‘from the theory of the 
central leadership role of the public sector to “economic plural-
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ism” in all public, private and joint sectors’ (ibid.). Neverthe-
less, the regime never turned fully against its public sector con-
stituencies, because the very nature of the rentier state demands 
that the state class exercises leadership based on public sector 
policies and the maintenance of corporatist institutions. Thus, 
experiments with the liberalization of the economy remain ul-
timately under the political command of the state class, which 
in this way ensures its own political survival.  
As for measures concerning political integration, Hafiz 
al-Assad expanded the network of corporatist political organi-
zations under the guidance of the governing Baath Party. This 
amounted to a process of ‘integration from above’: Nasserite 
and Communist organizations were invited to join the National 
Progressive Front and were also granted representation in the 
People’s Assembly (the Parliament), although the only NPF 
parties with a significant degree of popular support were the 
two factions of the Communist Party. In addition, the Kurdish 
minority received a degree of parliamentary representation and, 
in the 1990s, the new bourgeoisie was allowed to use the 
Chamber of Commerce as a lobbying body in its interaction 
with the government. 
Such ‘integration from above’ was contested by opposi-
tion from below. The main forces of the Syrian anti-
government opposition in the 1970s were secular leftist parties 
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and the Muslim Brotherhood. In the case of the former, the left-
ist groups suffered intense repression at the hands of the regime 
at the beginning of the 1980s from which they never recovered. 
In the case of the latter, the Muslim Brotherhood was originally 
characterized by a more moderate and a more radical wing and 
was also divided along regional and generational lines. Due to 
various external events, such as the intervention—originally on 
the side of Maronite Christians—by Syria in the Lebanese civil 
war after 1976, the radical Brotherhood wing gained the as-
cendancy. It started to shift from agitation against the secular 
Baath regime toward an armed sectarian campaign against the 
Alawite minority between 1976 and 1982 (Khatib 2011: 71-73; 
Lobmeyer 1995: 199). In this conflict, the Brotherhood was 
initially able to gain a certain degree of support from social 
constituencies that included craftsmen, traders, and elements of 
the traditional Sunni-urban bourgeoisie. In addition, some pro-
fessional organizations of doctors, engineers, and lawyers were 
also at various points in time under the influence of the Broth-
erhood. Nevertheless, the radicalized and armed Brotherhood 
failed in the contest for power with the regime, largely because 
the degree of support for the Brotherhood in Syrian society re-
mained limited in scope and even at its highest point in the late 
1970s never exceeded 30.000 (Daraj and Barut 2006, quoted in 
Khatib 2011: 81; Dekmejian, quoted in Lobmeyer 1995: 384).  
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Nor did urban workers employed in the public sector or 
the rural population extend any significant degree of support to 
the Brotherhood (Lobmeyer 1995: 389-390, 394). Moreover, 
the Brotherhood did not undertake serious efforts to construct a 
broader political coalition with other opposition forces. For ex-
ample, the short-term political alliance with the leftist secular 
opposition at the beginning of the 1980s lacked credibility and 
‘reflected in reality a deep cleavage between Islamists and sec-
ularists whose commonality remained limited to shared hostili-
ty to the ruling regime’ (ibid.: 301). More important, the 
Brotherhood accepted foreign financial and military assistance, 
principally from Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia 
and conservative Gulf states, to start a campaign of urban ter-
rorism against the Assad regime (Seale 1988: 335-338). The 
campaign of violence soon escalated, and rising numbers of 
regime representatives including pro-regime Sunni religious 
scholars were assassinated. There were some attempts to stop 
the escalation of violence, including regime efforts to come to 
an agreement with the Brotherhood in 1979, but these efforts 
all failed. In 1982, the Syrian army’s crushing of the uprising 
of the Brotherhood in the city of Hama ended the insurgency 
and resulted in the full-scale defeat of the organization.  
The political and military defeat of the Brotherhood un-
derlined that the Assad regime was still able to rely on a suffi-
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ciently large coalition of domestic supporters and that the 
Brotherhood’s policy of self-isolation and armed attack on the 
state had failed. This was in spite of the significant degree of 
external support that had been offered to the Brotherhood from 
a large coalition of outside powers who were keen to remove 
Assad and the Syrian state class from power. In the years after 
1982, and until the end of his life, Assad worked to improve the 
relationship with the Sunni community in general and Sunni 
religious leaders in particular. This policy of accommodation 
was based on efforts to promote a moderate religious leader-
ship by offering state resources for a large Mosque building 
program. One of the results of this policy, matched by similar 
efforts to sustain good relations with the other religious com-
munities in Syria, was an improvement in the relationship be-
tween the state and religious leaders—while earlier strongly 
secularist views of the Baath Party were increasingly sidelined 
(Khatib 2011, 2012). 
In summary, the leadership of Assad sustained the Syri-
an state class in power between 1970 and 2000. The first dec-
ade of his leadership was the most dynamic period in economic 
terms with high growth rates that are typical for countries in 
transition from an agricultural toward an industrial and service 
economy. The Syrian state engaged in this period in land re-
form and industrialization efforts that produced mixed results. 
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In terms of agricultural reform, the scope of land distribution 
might have been too limited while efforts to increase agricul-
tural productivity were more successful. As for industrializa-
tion, the build-up of state-owned industries was not 
comprehensive enough to create strong linkages between sec-
tors, and many public industries were from the beginning loss-
making entities. Nevertheless, these policies strengthened the 
country’s economic autonomy and domestic social compromis-
es based on expansion of the public sector. While the state still 
ultimately relied on income deriving from oil sales and political 
and strategic rents, Assad nevertheless sustained some degree 
of political autonomy of the state class. The Syrian state re-
mained practically independent from the international financial 
institutions, and Syria’s membership in IMF and World Bank 
did not result in any substantial economic involvement with 
these bodies. In short, the country always enjoyed some real 
sovereignty in dealings with allies and adversaries 
At the same time, there was already a slow but steady 
decline in the ability of the state class to advance comprehen-
sive social policies that would have allowed Syrian society in 
general and the rank-and-file of the state class in particular to 
be confident about future upward social mobility. (One of the 
indicators for the decline of internal social reformism was the 
failure of state employees’ salaries to keep in line with rises in 
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the cost of living.) In addition, internal cleavages within the 
state class were already observed during the 1980s when a 
‘new class’ or ‘military-mercantile complex’ of regime repre-
sentatives started mingling with representatives of the Sunni 
Damascene merchant class. This amounted to a ‘coalescence of 
those from different societal origins around newly encouraged 
economic activity’ (Terc 2011: 44). It was this new class fac-
tion originating from within the regime that subsequently ad-
vanced its economic demands in the context of global 
neoliberalism, demanding increased freedom for entrepreneur-
ship and private capital interests, thereby questioning the inter-
nal unity of the state class. 
 
4. The Presidency of Bashar al-Assad since 2000 
The accession to the Syrian Presidency of Bashar al-Assad fol-
lowing the death in office of his father Hafiz al-Assad on June 
10, 2000 underlined the fact that the Syrian ruling elite did not 
wish for any open contestation for power amongst the repre-
sentatives of the older leadership generation. Hafiz al-Assad’s 
style of leadership, which had denied any of his close associ-
ates the role of a natural successor, worked in favor of allowing 
his son access to the highest political office. The new president 
(aged 34 at the time of assuming office) symbolized genera-
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tional change and the opening up of the country to new cultural 
influences, from the expansion of English-language instruction 
in the education system to the introduction of the internet 
(Hinnebusch 2009: 12-13). Directly after the Syrian presiden-
tial succession, western commentators focused on the question 
of whether or not Bashar was merely serving to fulfill demands 
of existing regime power holders. However, it quickly became 
apparent that there was a real generational power shift as two 
thirds of the 60 most important regime posts were reappointed 
until 2003 (Abboud 2009: 17).  
Once firmly settled in office, Bashar’s leadership style 
and office shaping strategy nevertheless remained based on a 
gradual and mixed approach. In terms of domestic policymak-
ing, he refused to engage in any fundamental political reform 
efforts, although an increased degree of media liberalization 
and the rise of civil society organizations pointed towards a tac-
it opening of Syrian society. In the economic field, he contin-
ued the gradual liberalization approach that had already 
prevailed under his father. Yet the degree of economic liberali-
zation was significantly increased after 2005, underlining the 
drift in the higher echelons of the Syrian state class toward alli-
ances with the new bourgeoisie. In foreign policymaking, Syria 
continued to belong to an axis of resistance with Iran and Hiz-
ballah in Lebanon. Bashar sustained pan-Arab nationalist 
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claims such as support for Palestinian rights and demands for 
Israel to return the Syrian Golan Heights. However, he also ex-
plored opportunities to improve the relationship with the U.S. 
and the European Union (EU). However, these efforts suffered 
from the fact that U.S. policymakers continued to focus on ef-
forts to impose a pro-Israeli Pax Americana in the region re-
jecting any consideration of legitimate Arab and Syrian 
grievances (Hinnebusch 2009: 19).  
 In order to analyze Bashar’s Presidency, the first part of 
this section illustrates the period with a timeline. The latter part 
section sums up the outcomes of his policies in the economic 
field and with regard to the reform of the Syrian political sys-
tem. In terms of a timeline approach, the Presidency can be di-
vided into the following stages: (1) the transition period from 
the time of assuming office until the U.S.-led occupation of 
neighboring Iraq (2000-2003); (2) the first phase of sustained 
external pressure when the U.S. threatened regime change from 
outside (2003-2005); (3) the second period of sustained pres-
sure in which Syria was forced to withdraw its military pres-
ence in neighboring Lebanon in 2005; (4) the short stage of 
direct challenge of the axis of resistance during the border war 
between Israel and Hizballah in Lebanon in 2006; (5) the in-
creased shift of the Syrian regime toward economic liberaliza-
tion during the 10th Syrian Five Year Plan (2005-2010); (6) the 
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period between the beginning of the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ 
and the rise of public protests in Syria (2010-March 2011); and 
(7) the rapid deterioration of the Syrian domestic political sit-
uation beginning March 2011, with the beginning of the Syrian 
uprising and the consequent ongoing regime efforts to react 
with a combination of political reforms and repression.  
 Directly after entering office, the new president was 
greeted by a civil society movement with a leftist and liberal 
profile that was referred to as the ‘Damascus Spring’. This 
movement was primarily driven by intellectuals and demanded 
the abolition of the state of emergency, the release of political 
prisoners, and the introduction of a multi-party system in Syria. 
However, the intellectuals were unable to reach larger sections 
of the population or of the state class with their demands (Eck-
elt 2011a: 90). The movement was subsequently shut down by 
the security services at the end of 2001, and some people were 
arrested and tried in public courts for offences against national 
security laws. At the same time, the state did release some po-
litical prisoners and continued to tolerate some degree of liberal 
political activity. The issue of domestic democratization be-
came sidelined, however, when the Anglo-American occupa-
tion of neighboring Iraq in 2003 resulted in the closure of ranks 
amongst the Syrian leadership and the Syrian population at 
large.  
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Between 2003 and 2005, the Syrian leadership appeared 
to be next on a list of U.S. military-sponsored regime change in 
the region and seemed to be in real danger to fall victim to a 
second U.S. military campaign. U.S. intervention in Iraq quick-
ly triggered the full-scale breakdown of the Iraqi state along 
sectarian lines, and the high monetary and political cost of sub-
sequent U.S. counterinsurgency efforts made it clear to the U.S. 
leadership that additional military campaigns were not advisa-
ble. From the point of view of the Syrian leadership, the col-
lapse of the Iraqi state next door served as a warning that Syria 
might ‘turn into a second Iraq’. This fear was shared by the 
Syrian population at large and underlined by the presence of up 
to 1.5 million Iraqi refugees in the streets of Syria since the 
Syrian government had allowed Iraqi citizens to flee the sec-
tarian war at home by opening the country’s borders for Iraqis. 
In this situation, large-scale public rallies were organized in the 
streets of Syria which focused on pro-Syrian, pro-government, 
and pro-stability messages. These rallies were a real political 
success for the Syrian government and were based on the fear 
that war could come to Syria at this point in time (Hinnebusch 
2009: 23).  
In 2005, the contestation between Syria and the U.S.-led 
coalition quickly switched from the border between Syria and 
Iraq toward neighboring Lebanon. Here, the assassination of 
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former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq al-Hariri, who was 
strongly linked with Saudi and French interests, on February 
14, 2005 triggered the creation of a Franco-American coalition 
blaming Syria for the assassination and demanding (in UN 
Resolution 1559) the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Leba-
non. While a perpetrator has never been conclusively identi-
fied, Syria accepted that pressure to end its presence in 
Lebanon had become so severe that withdrawal of the Syrian 
troops was quickly concluded in May 2005. This withdrawal 
weakened the regional geopolitical role of Syria whose inter-
vention in the Lebanese Civil War since 1976 had been tacitly 
accepted by the U.S., Israel, and other regional powers to avoid 
a security vacuum and to maintain a balance between the dif-
ferent political forces and sects in Lebanon. In 2006, Israel 
promptly engaged in a border war with the Hizballah militia in 
the south of Lebanon in order to weaken this Shiite-political 
movement with the view of disarming it. However, rather than 
producing a quick military defeat of Hizballah, the 34-day war 
was interpreted in the Arab world as a military draw and as a 
strategic success for the resistance axis to which Syria be-
longed. Thus, the period directly after the 2006 confrontation 
between Hizballah and Israel in Lebanon was probably the 
most successful point in Bashar’s Presidency with regard to 
foreign policy. His alliance with Hizballah appeared to point to 
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a strong Syrian regional position regardless of the country’s 
earlier withdrawal from Lebanon (Hinnebusch 2009: 20; 
Valbjørn and Bank 2012: 4-7).     
What lessons did Bashar draw from the experiences 
with sustained U.S. pressure and the push against Syria’s stra-
tegic position in Lebanon? On the one hand, one might observe 
efforts to ‘construct multiple alliances, at both the regional and 
the international level, through which the pressure on Syria 
might be diluted and external resources accessed’ (Hinnebusch 
2009: 15). However, there was also another somehow contrary 
lesson: it appeared possible for Syria to punch above its weight 
in terms of resisting U.S.-led pressures due to the popularity of 
a resistance position in the Arab world. It also appeared possi-
ble for the axis of resistance to fully balance the conservative 
Gulf Arab countries. With the advantage of hindsight, this in-
terpretation of the geopolitical potential of Syria was clearly 
too far-reaching since it underestimated the superior resource 
endowment of the conservative Arab Gulf States and their will-
ingness to put these resources to use against Syria (and by ex-
tension against Iran) (Chivers and Schmitt 2013; Khalaf and 
Fielding-Smith 2013). Moreover, U.S. policymakers recovered 
to some extent from their lowest point after the Iraqi invasion 
(removing Saddam Hussein’s Sunni-based regime had actually 
served to strengthen the power of Shiite Iran since the post-
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Saddam Iraqi central government was principally Shiite). In 
fact, there are many indications that U.S. policymakers quietly 
remained committed to the project of regime change in Syria in 
the medium term (Hersh 2007).11 
 Geopolitical issues aside, Syria also faced the need to 
reconsider domestic economic strategy. In the period after 
2005, the international financial institutions, such as the IMF 
and the World Bank, as well as various Syrian participants 
committed to liberal economics, claimed that Syria’s prospects 
as a rentier state were rapidly deteriorating (IMF 2006). It was 
argued that, in order to deal with declining revenues from the 
oil sector, the government would have to cut state subsidies and 
the size of the public sector while allowing the private sector an 
economic leadership role in terms of attracting investment and 
creating jobs. This policy was put forward by those wishing to 
commit Syria to a free trade regime as advanced by the EU in 
the economic Association Agreements of the European Neigh-
borhood Policy. The Agreement would have allowed EU coun-
tries after a short transition period full access to the Syrian 
market, including domestic services and Syrian government 
procurement, while outlawing any Syrian government subsidies 
for domestic public sector enterprises (Dostal 2008). However, 
such efforts to liberalize the economy were subject to challeng-
es. Competition between economic liberalizers and advocates 
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of ‘corrective measures’ had already been apparent during the 
rule of Hafiz: this time around, the first coalition was described 
as ‘internationalist’ (consisting of traders, investors, and bank-
ers), while the latter was termed as ‘nationalist-statist’ (consist-
ing of the military, public sector, and other popular 
constituencies) (Ehteshami et al. 2013: 225).  
These more recent developments once again underlined 
the fact that rentier state policymaking follows a similar logic 
over time. From the point of view of Bashar, the conflict had to 
be managed rather than decided upon in favor of one of the two 
constituencies. From what is known about Bashar’s own views 
about economic management, he favored a gradual approach 
based on the continuing existence of a public sector but an in-
creased opening of the Syrian market for private sector invest-
ment. This compromise was formally presented in Syrian 
government discourse either as a shift to a ‘social market econ-
omy’ or as the ‘Chinese model’ in which the private sector was 
allowed to expand while the public sector was retained and re-
formed in parallel.  
In any case, the Syrian shift toward a market economy 
suffered from various shortcomings that all worked to question 
the prospects of liberal reformers to firmly establish their he-
gemony. First, most domestic Syrian capitalists were not able 
to flourish in a genuine market or to compete with international 
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capital. Success instead depended on business connections with 
the government and upon ‘crony capitalism.’ The most well-
known representative of the crony capitalists is Rami Ma-
khlouf, a cousin of Bashar, who is in charge of many domestic 
business ventures such as Syria’s mobile phone network Syri-
atel. The efforts of ‘crony capitalists’ to create business linkag-
es with international capital suffered, however, due to U.S.-led 
efforts to boycott and exclude them from business opportunities 
outside of Syria. Second, in order to attract international and 
especially Gulf Arab investment into Syria, the geopolitical 
conflict with Saudi Arabia and other countries worked as a bar-
rier. Although Syria succeeded in attracting some investment 
and therefore extracted a small share from the proceedings of 
the latest oil boom, this investment was mostly focused on a 
narrow luxury sector such as high-end hotels and luxury 
goods.12 Third, in terms of actual structural opening of the 
economy, Syria did allow increasing access of Turkish business 
interests into Syria, and this immediately threatened the com-
petitiveness of Syrian domestic producers, such as in the tex-
tiles sector. In summary, the Syrian shift toward private-sector 
driven growth did not solve the structural problems of the ren-
tier economy in crisis because the private sector’s ability to 
create new jobs and to replace the economic activities of the 
public sector remained too limited. 
Lessons from Political Science. 
 43 
The ‘nationalist-statist’ interests and ‘corrective wing’ 
representatives from the public sector still had to be accommo-
dated by the regime. The most crucial political economy ques-
tion was to what extent the state would continue to procure 
enough resources to satisfy the social interests of all factions of 
the state class. New rent income could be mobilized or, alterna-
tively, real cuts could be enforced in the government budget to 
improve government finances by means of austerity. However, 
any sophisticated quantitative examination of these issues 
would have to rely on up-to-date trustworthy data sources that 
are largely absent in the case of Syria. One can therefore only 
advance analysis based on stylized facts.  
As for the state’s rent income and its distribution, it has 
been suggested that Syrian society ‘appears to form a pyramid 
made up of different layers of rentiers, in which broader layers 
of the population further down profit less and less from the na-
tional rent income’ (Eckelt 2011b). In this sense, one must ana-
lyze how public sector salaries compare to the cost of living 
over time and what kind of state subsidies are made available 
for those Syrians who do not have access to employment in the 
public sector. This analysis must take into account that public 
sector employment is only offered to approx. 20 percent of the 
adult population.13 In addition, public sector employment is 
biased in terms of limiting access to the more highly educated 
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sectors of the population with intermediate and university-level 
degrees, therefore reinforcing existing social cleavages (Buck-
ner and Saba 2010: 88-89). Outside of the public sector, state 
subsidization of staple foods, petrol, and heating gas forms the 
only generally available social policy and one that has histori-
cally been the core part of the social contract in order to protect 
the population from extreme poverty. Replacing such policies 
with more targeted anti-poverty programs is difficult or impos-
sible due to the limited administrative capabilities of the Syrian 
state. Indeed, any attack on these general subsidies has histori-
cally been associated with large-scale discontent in most Arab 
countries.  
It is therefore not surprising that Syrian state policy 
continued to be based on compromise with public sector inter-
ests. The early period of Bashar’s Presidency before 2003 en-
joyed a windfall gain from oil revenues due to Iraqi oil transfer 
payments—a policy adopted to undermine U.S. sanctions 
against Iraqi oil sales. However, the share of oil income in Syr-
ian government revenue, according to government sources, 
subsequently declined from 58 percent in 2001 to 27 percent at 
the end of the decade (Al-Thawra, quoted in Memrieconom-
icblog 2010).14 The initial increase in income had produced job 
growth in the public sector, but the rapid subsequent decline 
prompted questions regarding all government spending pro-
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grams, and most government decisions since then concerned 
cuts or full-scale removal of subsidies. For example, the agri-
cultural price guarantees that distributed some of Syria’s oil 
income to rural constituencies while also controlling the prices 
for urban consumers were cut from 3.7 percent to 2 percent of 
GDP between 2000 and 2005 and the price subsidies for staple 
foods, petrol, and diesel all declined incrementally. On the oth-
er hand, full-scale privatization of public sector enterprise was 
avoided and the public sector was frequently compensated for 
rising prices by parallel increases in public sector wages.  
To sum up the economic situation, one needs to stress 
that the decision of the state to protect its own core constituen-
cy against the effects of inflation was not sufficient to maintain 
social peace. Rural areas in particular were hit hard by econom-
ic reform and cuts in subsidies, also falling victim to a long pe-
riod of drought. While liberal government reformers under the 
managerial leadership of former deputy prime minister for eco-
nomic affairs Abdullah al-Dardari tried to spread the message 
that flat-rate general subsidies were too expensive to be main-
tained, arguing that targeted welfare and a social safety net 
should replace the existing system, the actual development on 
the ground was to enforce cuts without previous introduction of 
adequate side payments. However one interprets these devel-
opments, one must appreciate that policy still remained within 
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the framework of the rentier state: in particular, the liberal re-
formers were politically controlled and quietly left the stage 
when the domestic political order started to break down in 
2011. Entering crisis mode, the regime immediately appointed 
prominent representatives of the ‘corrective wing’ such as 
Qadri Jamil, a former Communist and current leader of a minor 
leftist opposition party in the Syrian parliament, to take over 
the position formerly held by al-Dardari. In short, the political 
initiative was recaptured by the ‘nationalist-statist’ wing of the 
regime in its fight for survival (this is further discussed be-
low).15 
Turning to analysis of the political leadership of Bashar 
before the 2011 crisis, the general impression was that the re-
gime and government were united. Serious challenges to Ba-
shar’s leadership did not occur in public.16 Some minor 
adjustments of the formal political system occurred. For exam-
ple, the SSNP, which had not previously been a legal political 
party in Syria, was recognized and subsequently joined the 
NPF. It became clear that the former competitors for power af-
ter the independence of Syria (i.e. the Baath Party, SSNP, and 
SCP) were drawn more closely together. What was problemat-
ic, on the other hand, was the actual conduct of regime policy 
outside of the formal political system. Here, the apparent ac-
ceptance of Bashar’s leadership was paid for by the delegation 
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of authority and autonomy to other prominent regime stake-
holders. Crucially, effective steering of the regime was difficult 
according to Bashar’s own opinion: ‘We have a lot of ideas, but 
we do not know how to implement them. We issue laws, but 
we do not implement them. I issue a decree and the government 
should implement it, but now I have to follow up on everything 
all the time’ (Assad, quoted in Lesch 2005: 200). There is, of 
course, nothing peculiarly Syrian about the problem of gov-
ernment coordination; although the general impression of the 
Syrian state under Bashar’s leadership was that he tasked dif-
ferent people with different (and often contradictory) projects 
while overall coordinative capabilities were rather weak. Once 
again, this is typical of a rentier state in which different factions 
of the state class advance mutually contradictory social and po-
litical objectives. 
 
5. The crisis in Syria since 2011 
The so-called Arab Spring started off with the fall of Ben Ali in 
Tunisia on January 14, 2011, and ended, for the time being, 
with the Egyptian military coup that removed the Muslim 
Brotherhood from power on July 3, 2013. Initially, Syria ap-
peared to be unaffected by events that led to multiple rounds of 
regime change in some other Arab countries such as Egypt, 
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Libya and Tunisia. In the period before March 2011, the Syrian 
government claimed that the internal opposition was complete-
ly unable to mobilize in the streets due to the close linkages 
between the regime and the people. Once the unarmed and 
armed opposition groups succeeded in a certain degree of mo-
bilization, the regime responded with a combination of repres-
sive measures and counter-mobilization based on a series of 
defiant speeches of Bashar (four speeches each in 2011 and 
2012 given on symbolically important days and within signifi-
cant venues such as the Syrian parliament, the University of 
Damascus, and on the occasion of army day).  
Most of Bashar’s speeches were subsequently followed 
by state-sponsored pro-regime mobilization waves that went 
underreported or were ignored in the Western media.17 These 
pro-government rallies took place in all major cities and 
amounted in all likelihood to the largest political manifestations 
in Syria’s history. The motivation of participants was at least 
partially due to many Syrian people’s intention to avoid a fur-
ther escalation of violence. It should be stressed that the gov-
ernment-sponsored rallies in 2011 and 2012 were similar to 
those that had taken place during the period when the U.S. ad-
ministration of George W. Bush had threatened with imposed 
regime change from outside after 2003. Once again, many Syr-
ians rallied around the government since the alternatives were 
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considered to be worse rather than better. There was certainly a 
strong element of support for President Bashar al-Assad and for 
Syrian state nationalism. The regime speakers and Bashar him-
self stressed the foreign policy stance of Syria, a stance charac-
terized by a support for Palestine and a desire to regain the 
Golan Heights. In this context, Bashar asserted that the opposi-
tion was sponsored and armed by external powers, especially 
the U.S., Turkey, and conservative Arab Gulf states, in order to 
punish Syria for the long-term policy of resisting U.S. and Is-
raeli objectives. While the pro-government rallies certainly did 
not restore the authority of the regime to speak on behalf of all 
Syrians, they did show that the regime still enjoyed some de-
gree of legitimacy. 
The next step involved Bashar beginning to talk about 
domestic political reform. Two projects were discussed and 
rapidly implemented, namely the introduction of a new consti-
tution to replace the 1973 Syrian constitution and a new party 
law that would be followed by the election of a new Parlia-
ment. These projects were put forward at a relatively early 
stage of the crisis (for example, the idea of a new party law was 
first mentioned by Bashar in a speech on April 16, 2011). As a 
result of the rapid escalation of the crisis and the steady in-
crease of violence in the streets, the two reform projects failed, 
however, to trigger a genuine political dialogue beyond gov-
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ernment circles. They were, therefore, based on formulae of 
compromise within the state class and amounted to reforms 
from above.  
The single most significant element of the reforms was 
certainly the new draft constitution. This document tried to sat-
isfy the demands of different constituencies: gradual changes 
were offered in combination with reassurances for existing 
power holders. The most noteworthy change was the removal 
of the old article 8 of the 1973 constitution that had defined the 
Baath Party as the ‘leading force in the society and the state’ 
(ICL project, no date: article 8). Instead, Syria’s political sys-
tem is now supposed to ‘be based on the principle of political 
pluralism, and exercising power democratically through the 
ballot box’ (SANA 2012: article 8). Yet this transfer to a multi-
party system is not matched by an expansion of the legislative 
powers of the Syrian parliament. The new 2012 constitution 
still defines parliament as a reactive body tasked to deliberate 
over proposals deriving from the president and the prime min-
ister. However, there was a subtle upgrading of the role of par-
liament in regards to the nomination process for the presidency. 
Here, the new constitution demands that presidential candidates 
must first receive the support of at least 35 members of parlia-
ment and no parliamentarian is allowed to support more than 
one candidate at the same time. In addition, the new constitu-
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tion appears to demand that there should be at least two candi-
dates for the office of president in any future election (SANA 
2012: article 85(5)).18  
As far as the all-important institution of the presidency 
is concerned, the exceptionally strong authorities granted by 
the old constitution have been maintained. The president still 
appoints the government and continues to forward his own 
draft laws to parliament for approval. Although the new consti-
tution limits the exercise of the presidency to two single terms 
of seven years, this new time limit starts only with the next 
presidential election in 2014. The constitution allows this elec-
tion to be delayed in the case of national emergency. It follows 
that Bashar could theoretically seek re-election in 2014 and 
2021 and could remain in office (if elected) until 2028. The 
role of the prime minister and of the government remains prac-
tically unchanged in the new constitution, since the president 
still directly appoints both. As for the judiciary, the new consti-
tution slightly expands the rights of the Syrian Supreme Consti-
tutional Court since the new article 146(5) allows for the first 
time trials of the president in cases of high treason. However 
such a law is unlikely to be used, given that the president ap-
points all members of the Supreme Constitutional Court (article 
141).19 One could understand the new provisions as a symbolic 
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endorsement of the idea of a division of judicial and executive 
powers—although these are certainly very weak.  
Crucially, the new constitution retains article 3 of the 
1973 constitution, an article that states that the president of 
Syria must be a Muslim. However the new constitutional oath 
of office (article 7) drops the reference to ‘unity, freedom, and 
socialism’ that defined the rule of the Baath Party in the 1973 
document. Moreover, the 2012 constitution no longer makes 
any reference to socialism, a difference that could possibly be 
interpreted as a symbolic endorsement of the demands of eco-
nomic liberalizers. Last but not least, the new constitution en-
dorses a multi-party system, but continues to outlaw political 
parties formed on ‘religious, sectarian, tribal, [class-based], re-
gional, or professional basis’ (SANA 2012: article 8(4)).20 This 
emphasizes the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood and other Is-
lamist groups remain banned under the new constitution. There 
is also scope to outlaw various other political parties such as 
Kurdish nationalists and class-based and/or professional par-
ties. Lastly, the new constitution requires that at least 50 per-
cent of members of Parliament must be from the ‘worker and 
peasant social classes’ (SANA 2012: article 60(2)). This provi-
sion underlines a continuing commitment toward ‘class-based’ 
parliamentary legitimacy that appears to be in conflict with 
some of the other constitutional provisions. On February 26, 
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2012, the new constitution was endorsed by a majority of Syri-
ans in a referendum. According to the official results, the new 
constitution was supported by 89.4 percent of the voters on a 
turnout of 57.4 percent of the electorate (quoted according to 
Direct Democracy 2012).21 
Because its constitutional status as a ‘leading force’ was 
abolished, it might appear as if the only group within the Syrian 
state class that lost out in the new constitution was the Baath 
Party. Yet even it enjoyed some gains in the sense that the new 
constitution demanded a new parliamentary election under the 
new multi-party system within 90 days. This time frame was 
too short for new parties to organize and campaign in a serious 
manner. While there was a steep increase in the number of reg-
istered parties, the electoral system, based on 15 multi-seat re-
gional constituencies, clearly favored large coalitions. As a 
result, the number of Baath Party members in the new parlia-
ment, elected on May 7, 2012, on a 51.3 percent turnout of the 
electorate according to official figures, was higher than before. 
The Baath Party gained 134 seats out of 250 and the organiza-
tion’s alliance with the NPF parties added further to the Baath-
led parliamentary bloc. The fact that the overwhelming majori-
ty of opposition forces did not participate in the election left 
only one leftist opposition alliance, the ‘Popular Front for 
Change and Liberation’ to contest the election, and it gained 
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five seats. A third of the seats went to independent candi-
dates—as had already been the case pre-reform—while only 
one of the other eleven new parties received a single seat (Ah-
mad Kousa for the Syrian Democratic Party). Thus, the Baath 
Party enjoyed a higher share of representation in the new Par-
liament than before and the multi-party system did not really 
take off in any substantial way.  
Any serious evaluation of the reform program in its cur-
rent form (i.e. the 2012 reform policies based on the new con-
stitution and the new parliament) must conclude that it is too 
limited in scope to offer those sections of the opposition willing 
to negotiate with the government a real stake in policymaking. 
In particular, the 2012 constitution severely limits the field of 
presidential candidates insofar as it requires at least 35 mem-
bers of Parliament to support any candidate in writing. No po-
litical party other than the Baath Party under the leadership of 
Bashar currently fulfills the criteria of assembling 35 members 
of Parliament. Under the current rules, one might imagine that 
there would be two more potentially feasible candidates (one 
based on an alliance of Socialist Unionists (18 seats in Parlia-
ment) and other leftists and one based on a candidate backed by 
economic liberalizers). However, there would be serious ques-
tion marks behind each of these candidacies, and all other op-
position groups would essentially remain excluded. In this 
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context, the seemingly innocent article 153 of the new constitu-
tion, which states that no amendments of the new constitution 
are possible before the passing of 18 months, means that the 
state could run the 2014 presidential elections without any re-
consideration of the way in which presidential candidates 
would be selected. That this constitutes a problem that severely 
limits the scope for dialogue with the opposition appears by 
now to be accepted by Bashar himself. In a speech delivered on 
January 6, 2013, he suggested a new national dialogue that 
should result in concluding a national pact. This process would 
in effect entail another new constitution, new party law, and 
new parliamentary elections (SANA 2013). How these sugges-
tions relate to the issue of the next presidential elections re-
mains unclear and would in any case depend on the results of a 
forthcoming Syrian national dialogue. 
What new lessons can be drawn about the nature of the 
Syrian state after three years of sustained crisis? Syria has al-
ways been a relatively weak rentier state due to the limited 
amount of oil revenues. By now, it could be argued that Syria 
has completely stopped being a rentier state, at least as far as 
the oil revenues are concerned. Initially, this was due to the de-
cision of the EU in early 2012 to boycott Syria economically 
by stopping the oil imports. This immediately weakened the 
resources base of the Syrian state to a large extent since Syrian 
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exports to the EU in 2011—the last year of normal economic 
relations—consisted to more than 84 percent of ‘mineral fuels’ 
(oil and oil-related products) while some 94 percent of all Syri-
an oil exports went to EU member states, principally Germany, 
France, and Italy (DG Trade 2012: 7; EIA 2011: 3). This high 
degree of Syrian dependency on oil revenues from just three 
EU member states meant that the Syrian state was under pres-
sure to immediately procure alternative sources of income at 
the cost of facing severe economic crisis. (In the meantime, the 
devastation of much of the country through war and economic 
sabotage has destroyed the revenue base of the state and the 
livelihood of ordinary Syrians.) 
Nevertheless, politics cannot be reduced to economics, 
and the unity of the Syrian state class has essentially been 
maintained. The degree of internal stability of the state class 
(and to some extent of the state) is symbolized by Bashar’s 
public speeches in front of constituencies supporting the regime 
and by his regular participation in Muslim religious holidays 
during which he is accompanied by the moderate Sunni reli-
gious leaders of Syria. Whether or not Bashar and the Syrian 
state class will continue to sustain the state depends of course 
on economic and political factors that are yet to be settled. As 
for the prospects of political reform, the current balance of 
forces suggests that there is a conflict at the national (Syrian), 
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regional (Arab), and global level. Each of these levels interacts 
with the others and even if a balance could be reached at every 
single level, the conflict would nevertheless continue for a long 
time.  
Last but not least, the question of dialogue between the 
Syrian regime and the domestic opposition is certainly crucial. 
Nevertheless, these deliberations will not end the crisis as long 
as Arab and global actors do not support it. International ob-
servers must by now appreciate that the Syrian opposition is 
highly fragmented, that transnational Islamist and terrorist net-
works are operating in Syria, and that externally sponsored 
groups of opposition leaders compete with each other as much 
as they do with the Syrian government. At present, some do-
mestic opposition groups can be distinguished for their willing-
ness to support the government in the current crisis. These 
groups consist of elements of the SSNP, SCP, and other leftist 
factions. They entered the political reform process in 2011 and 
2012, and some representatives subsequently became part of 
the current Syrian government. A second moderate opposition 
group, also made up of leftist, centrist, and secular democratic 
parties, has formed the ‘National Coordination Committee for 
Democratic Change’. This group is in principle willing to nego-
tiate with the Syrian government and has stressed that they are 
against any outside intervention of NATO countries in Syria. 
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They have warned that ‘militarization means political and fi-
nancial dependency on the military opposition, the marginaliza-
tion of democratic forces, and the reinforcement of sectarian 
extremist and black Islamism groups: Black like oil, black like 
darkness and black like exclusion’ (Manna 2012).  
Beyond these minor moderate opposition groups, how-
ever, the Syrian insurgency consist by now of at least 1,000 
armed group with around 100,000 fighters—the overwhelming 
number of them Islamists rather than secular nationalists—and 
at least half a dozen opposition leadership bodies (IHS 2013). 
These two sets of insurgency organizations are only loosely 
coupled and they all compete with each other for support, fund-
ing and patronage at the local, regional, and global level. 
In this context, peaceful political activity of any kind is 
at present nearly impossible in Syria: it is no longer possible to 
find out what ordinary Syrians might think about the crisis; nor, 
indeed, does it seem to matter much as the country suffers from 
a general breakdown of civil society triggered by a mechanical 
upgrading of the forces of violence in the context of a global 
geopolitical power contest. This conflict by proxy is not the 
fault of ordinary Syrians: they are paying the price for being in 
the wrong place at the wrong time. In the context of hope for 
democracy in the Arab world, the events in Syria underline 
how dangerous it is to expect proxy conflicts to open the door 
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to democracy. On the contrary, the Arab Gulf countries, the 
most authoritarian regimes in the region, appear to export their 
own version of authoritarianism toward more secular and toler-
ant societies such as Syria.  
 
Conclusion 
The point of departure of this paper has been to question how 
political science theory can contribute to the analysis of the 
domestic and international factors behind the Syrian crisis. In 
this concluding section, each of the five theoretical perspec-
tives, i.e. (1) populist authoritarianism; (2) sectarianism; (3) 
rentier state theory; (4) neo-Gramscian approach in internation-
al relations; and (5) classical geopolitical thought are briefly 
reviewed in the light of the previous empirical discussion. Most 
importantly, each of the theoretical schools is useful in explain-
ing the Syrian case; yet no single analytical perspective should 
be elevated above any other. It is only by combining different 
theories and qualitative and quantitative approaches that one 
can start to appreciate the many complex power relationships 
that have since March 2011 triggered a crisis of Syrian state-
hood, Qualitative research has to be respected, since a solid da-
ta base for quantitative research is often absent in the Syrian 
case.22  
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Firstly, populist authoritarianism helps understanding 
the power resources of the Syrian state class. The core issue is 
whether the state class can continue to act as a unified actor and 
whether it remains possible to sustain the domestic social pat-
ronage that in the past helped to unite different social and re-
gional segments of Syrian society. Thus, the theory of populist 
authoritarianism highlights the fact that the state class must 
necessarily sustain social coalitions with popular sectors or face 
an existential crisis of its leadership. In addition, the theory also 
suggests that the stability and scope of domestic social coali-
tions directly determine the country’s geopolitical strength. 
Conversely, efforts of sections of the state class to engage in 
liberalization of the economy and the subsequent socio-
economic abandonment of former regime constituencies might 
trigger domestic disturbances questioning regime stability. 
Lastly, one could also use the theory to explain why Syria is 
linked in its geopolitical alliances with certain other countries 
that are also driven by different versions of populist authoritar-
ianism, such as Iran, Russia, and Venezuela. These states have 
little in common; yet they all share a reliance on rent income 
and have all made efforts to integrate popular sectors based on 
some version of state-led social reform. 
 Secondly, the analytical focus on sectarianism and 
weak statehood might also add to an understanding of the Syri-
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an case. The current crisis certainly increases sectarianism and 
threatens to break society along sectarian lines as happened in 
neighboring Iraq after the U.S. invasion in 2003. Thus, the Syr-
ian ethnic and religious minorities certainly have no incentive 
to support those sectors of the opposition that are sponsored by 
outside powers. Nevertheless, the analytical focus on sectarian-
ism does not explain why the crisis of the Syrian state occurs 
now. In fact, there exists no serious domestic demand in Syria 
to solve the current crisis by splitting the country into ethnical-
ly homogenous smaller states.23 For one thing, this would not 
be possible in most areas of Syria, and the resulting small states 
would inevitably fall under the influence of neighboring coun-
tries and lack any long-term viability. Moreover, any division 
of Syria would encourage similar projects elsewhere. Thus, one 
must stress that many actors within Syria have consciously 
maintained a Syrian national unity position. For example, Syri-
an religious leaders from all denominations have stressed their 
determination to defend Syrian statehood and unity. One there-
fore needs to stress that Syria’s religious and ethnic diversity 
could still add to a new Syrian nationalism that is accommodat-
ing rather than divisive and sectarian. 
Thirdly, this paper has focused heavily on theories of 
the rentier state and the state class as advanced by Elsenhans, 
Eckelt, and other authors. The advantage of this particular theo-
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retical perspective is to demonstrate that Syria is not a unique 
case in the international system. Rather, many of the shortcom-
ings of Syrian statehood are shared with rentier states in other 
parts of the world. In addition, the two theories of the rentier 
state and of populist authoritarianism mutually support each 
other. Both theories highlight the need for the Syrian state class 
to sustain a sufficient degree of rent income in order to main-
tain domestic stability. In the Syrian case, the fact is that oil 
revenues are at the lower end of what is usually understood to 
be the minimum threshold of a rentier economy. Nevertheless, 
rentier state theory also holds that a country can replace oil 
rents with political and strategic rents. In the future, the Syrian 
state class must certainly explore new revenue opportunities in 
order to restore the country’s economic foundations. Perhaps, 
Syria will still be able to gain new rent income from the devel-
opment of currently untouched gas resources located along the 
country’s Mediterranean coast and/or from revenue-producing 
pipeline projects linking Iranian oil fields with Iraq, Syria, and 
the Mediterranean Sea (or, alternatively, plans to link Syria and 
Iran with China). In theory, an improvement of relations with 
EU states could also be pursued. Yet the EU’s past unwilling-
ness to provide substantial assistance has forced the Syrian 
state class to look for more promising alternatives elsewhere. 
This has resulted in recent efforts to ‘go east’ toward China or 
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to link up with regional neighboring states such as Turkey (in 
the latter case certainly a full-scale failure). Another major 
problem of the Syrian state class is that most of the country’s 
close allies tend to have similar economic profiles; thus Syria 
has little bargaining power in terms of dealing with other ren-
tier countries. As for China, Syria currently only serves as an 
export market for Chinese products although China, as a non-
rentier state, could in principle offer a promising future market 
for Syrian oil and gas. At present, the Syrian state class relies 
heavily on Iran as a close geopolitical ally. Yet this will not 
keep the Syrian economy afloat indefinitely. The state class 
requires a long-term social and developmental project that 
would offer credible prospects for the social advancement of 
large shares of the Syrian population. In the past, this was oc-
casionally a feasible proposition, but the current state of Syria 
is far removed from offering any such prospects. 
Fourthly, the neo-Gramscian approach highlights how 
the crisis of the Syrian state class relates to global hegemony 
and the distribution of class power in the international system. 
This concerns the conflict within the Syrian state class between 
economic liberalizers on the one hand and public sector con-
stituencies on the other. The question is whether the state class 
acquires most of its economic and political power from its con-
trol of the state and from domestic resources or, alternatively, 
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from mediating between the demands of international capital 
and local constituencies. In other words, is the state class able 
to act autonomously, as suggested by concepts of populist au-
thoritarianism and rentier state theory, or is it rather bound by 
alliances with outside capital interests in which it must submit 
to more powerful forces? The example of the Syrian regime’s 
‘crony capitalists’ is a case in point. This group, deriving from 
within the regime, has always stressed that they would like to 
be treated like ‘ordinary businesses’ in the international arena. 
However, they faced boycott by the U.S. and EU, which under-
lines that the crony capitalists, too, were unable to overcome 
the power limits of the Syrian state class. Although the latter is 
strong in the exercise of political and economic power at home, 
it is extremely weak and without any credible bargaining power 
outside of the Syrian national territory. In addition, neo-
Gramscian approaches can also help to highlight a broader 
structural crisis of the state in developing societies. Here, the 
international system, with its asymmetric power relations be-
tween the center and the periphery, severely curtails the agency 
of any kind of political leadership in developing societies. The 
rise of political Islam is itself one outcome of this long-term 
structural crisis that was earlier encountered by secular nation-
alist elites when they proved unable to satisfy popular expecta-
tions. The case of the short-term Muslim Brotherhood 
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government in Egypt until 2013 underlines how Islamist forces 
also remain bound by the limits of weak statehood and a struc-
tural dependency on international capital. Indeed, any future 
Syrian leadership will essentially face similar economic chal-
lenges—challenges that do not differ much from those the cur-
rent government has to deal with in terms of choices of national 
development model. 
Fifthly, the Syrian crisis must also be analyzed from the 
point of view of classical geopolitical thought. Here, one must 
appreciate that Bashar’s leadership between 2000 and 2011 ap-
peared to U.S. policymakers as a permanent provocation. A 
case in point was the 2010 meeting between Bashar and the 
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in which the former 
criticized the ‘new situation of colonialism’ while the latter 
suggested that ‘[t]he whole U.S. government has no impact 
whatsoever on regional relations’ and ‘should pack their things 
and leave’ (CNN 2010; Schneider 2010). For U.S. regional 
strategists, the main concern has in fact been to put pressure on 
an Iran that is considered the main opponent of U.S. objectives 
in the region. In this context, Syria is seen as little more than 
another pressure point, and Syrian affairs are considered undis-
tinguishable from the broader agenda of pushing back the axis 
of resistance. This has always been stated openly in the U.S. 
foreign policy discourse (Byman, Doran et al. 2012).24 The be-
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havior of the anti-Syrian coalition in the Arab world can there-
fore be explained with various political and economic interests, 
such as control of oil, gas, and pipeline rights. Thus, the global 
context of the Syrian crisis relates on the one hand to the issue 
of U.S. unilateral control and on the other to the alternative 
scenario of a more multipolar world order with an upgraded 
regional and global role for Russia, China, and other countries. 
Looking at the current state of the Syrian crisis, one might sug-
gest that the U.S. have already achieved the major goal of turn-
ing Syria into a weak state.  
Of course, one could also interpret the current situation 
as characterized by a new balance of power at the domestic 
Syrian level (the government essentially continues to function 
due to assistance from Iran and Russia while the insurgency is 
also maintained by outside powers), the regional Arab level 
(the Sunni states, Turkey, and the Shia states all suffer from 
domestic disturbances to various degrees that make further es-
calation of the Syrian crisis even more dangerous), and the 
global level (Russia and China move slowly toward a more as-
sertive posture in terms of their relationship with U.S. policy-
makers). These are all issues beyond the scope of this paper. 
One might simply conclude that the current situation has under-
lined how contested the Greater Middle East remains and how 
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little EU member states have been able to assert any objectives 
on their own. 
Lastly, how could the Syrian crisis be solved at the do-
mestic and international level? There is no doubt that the short-
comings of the Syrian state do relate to the fact that the 
principle of ‘winner-takes-all’ structures the entire political 
system. The all-powerful institution of the Syrian Presidency 
and the lack of power of the other formal political institutions 
and of civil society mean that Syria cannot currently be stabi-
lized by way of power sharing. It is certainly the case that re-
forms of the formal institutions, allowing for a rebalancing of 
political authority and increasing degrees of power sharing, 
could open the way to create a more democratic and more ac-
countable system. In this context, the tools of consociational 
democracy (Lijphart 2012) could help to slowly transform the 
Syrian state and could bridge the deep cleavages in Syrian so-
ciety over a longer period of time based on the principle of 
power sharing and the protection of minorities. Yet democracy 
is not going to come to Syria in a single step. Any credible pro-
spect for democracy would require an end to the geopolitical 
contest over Syria, and an opportunity for the domestic actors 
to mutually engage with each other in order to allow national 
reconciliation and the building of trust. There is little hope at 
present due to the sustained escalation of violence that has hor-
68    Contextualizing the Syrian Uprising 
 68 
rified most Syrians and makes some militants believe that one 
more effort is going to break the opponent. However, this logic 
is the greatest obstacle to democracy in Syria and the region. 
Thus, the need to agree on a negotiated settlement in Syria is 
beyond doubt and cannot be achieved by violent means. 
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2 Conversely, it is necessary to ‘take into consideration that 
there is no clear sectarian dichotomy in Syrian society, dividing 
the country into Alawis and non-Alawis. Syria has never been 
ruled by “the Alawi community” as such’ (Dam 2011b). 
3 All translations from German-language sources are by the au-
thor. 
4 According to Elsenhans, ‘public sector employees differ from 
other client groups of the state class in growing as of necessity 
in parallel with the rise in importance of the state class. They 
differ from the other client groups of the state class that can 
change in accordance with different economic strategies…. 
[E]mployees in the public sector are the “organic clients” of the 
state class….’ (1981: 122, see also 23-24, 121).  
5 There is a danger to overextend the theory of the rentier state 
to include states that enjoy primarily political and strategic 
rents. For example, Israel could be considered as a rentier states 
because of its privileged economic relationship with the U.S.A. 
However, such expansive use of the theory, including patron-
client relationships, ignores the direct analytical link with re-
source-based extraction of rent income.  
6 The Carter Doctrine of 23 January 1980 (inspired by Zbig-
niew Brzezinski) once again explicitly stated that the U.S. 
would consider any threat to its geopolitical position in the 
Middle East as a legitimate reason to use military force. This 
has been reiterated by Obama in his UN speech on 24 Septem-
ber 2013 stating that ‘[t]he United States of America is pre-
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pared to use all elements of our power, including military force, 
to secure our core interests in the region’ (Washington Post 
2013). 
7 Notionally, the Syrian Baath Party still maintains a National 
and a Regional [i.e. Syrian] Command. However, the Regional 
Command is in fact the actual party leadership body. (This pa-
per does not discuss the case of the Iraqi Baath Party.) 
8 The ‘Corrective Movement’ led by Hafiz al-Assad assumed 
power in 1970, and Assad became the Syrian president in 1971. 
9 In addition, Syrian labor migration to richer Arab countries 
such as Lebanon and Saudi Arabia allowed access to remit-
tance payments. These payments improved the economic situa-
tion of many Syrian families. 
10 Parliamentary powers to supervise the national budget are 
limited in scope and parliament is ‘not to engage in compre-
hensive control of the executive, especially not of the president 
who can dissolve parliament at any point …. The [parliamen-
tary] veto power as regards presidential degrees was de facto 
not used’ (Eckelt 2011a: 53). 
11 The account of Hersh is a significant source explaining how 
the second George W. Bush administration’s ‘redirection’ 
(Hersh) of regional policy, lining up U.S. objectives with Sunni 
states and constituencies against Shiite power in the region, 
continues to inform the strategy of the Obama administration.  
12 In terms of establishing private capital as an influential play-
er in Syrian domestic affairs, these investments were neverthe-
less of some significance because they allowed the construction 
of direct links between Syrian and external capital interests—
potentially bypassing the mediating role of the state class (Eck-
elt 2011a: 116). 
13 The actual size of Syrian government employment depends 
on how one conceptualizes the different categories such as cen-
tral government, non-central government, education, health, 
public enterprise, and the armed forces. In fact, only some of 
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these groups enjoy privileges that have historically been asso-
ciated with the Syrian concept of public sector employment. 
14 Similar figures are given in a second source stating that ‘in 
2003, some 51% of government revenue came from oil re-
ceipts, an amount equal to 20% of GDP and 58% of exports…. 
[I]n 2008 oil-related revenues accounted for 26.6% of total rev-
enue, or just half of the level from five years previous. The 
IMF estimates that the 2010 figure is likely to be around 25%’ 
(Oxford Business Group 2011: 94). 
15 In turn, Jamil was dismissed from his post on 29 September 
2013 for ‘activities outside the nation without coordinating 
with the government’, according to Syrian state TV. The office 
of deputy prime minister for economic affairs has been left va-
cant since then. 
16 Some observers interpreted the retirement of the Syrian Vice 
President and last prominent representative of the old guard 
Abdul Halim Khaddam during the 2005 Baath Party conference 
as a sign of internal discontent. Khaddam had held his position 
since 1984 and, following his retirement, left for France where 
he started to link up with the Muslim Brotherhood in exile to 
form a ‘National Salvation Front’. By then, he had lost his in-
fluence in Syria but it was speculated at the time that the politi-
cal significance of his retirement might have to do with the 
defeat of a ‘pro-Saudi’ wing in the Syrian leadership that was 
closely related to the Syrian presence in Lebanon (Salloukh 
2009). 
17 For example, large pro-regime rallies took place across Syria 
on November 28, 2011, January 11, 2012, and March 15, 2012. 
Perhaps one in four adult Syrians attended these rallies. 
18 Indeed, the new constitution is hazy on this point as it de-
mands in article 85 that the speaker of parliament ‘should call 
for fresh nominations’ if only a single candidate meets the con-
dition of enjoying the support of ‘at least 35 members’ of par-
liament. In this context, it is unclear whether or not the word 
‘should’ demands at least two presidential candidates. On the 
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other hand, article 86(2) suggests that the presidential election 
must be competitive. 
19 In an interesting twist, the official SANA English-language 
translation remains ambiguous as for the right of the president 
to appoint all members of the Supreme Court while an alterna-
tive version of the translation states that this is in fact the case 
(Qordoba 2012).  
20 In another twist in the English-language translation of the 
new constitution, the term ‘class-based’ is included in the offi-
cial SANA translation but missing in the unofficial Qordoba 
translation.  
21 There was no independent monitoring of the referendum and 
no voting took place in those parts of Syria that were under the 
control of the insurgents. 
22 For example, some analysts suggest that the political stability 
of rentier states depends on reaching a certain minimum 
threshold of rent income (Basedau and Lay 2009), and that Syr-
ia does therefore not qualify for stable statehood. However, 
there is no absolute rule, since the same analysts hold that rich 
Bahrain is bound to enjoy political stability, even though that 
stability recently had to be reinforced by Saudi tanks.  
23 For example, Kurdish minority rights and autonomy in Syria 
would not be advanced by forming a small new state. Such new 
entity would certainly suffer from threats of neighboring states, 
especially Turkey. Most Syrian Kurdish political leaders there-
fore demand a higher degree of autonomy within Syria and 
have avoided any association with the armed opposition. They 
have so far largely succeeded in protecting Kurdish regions in 
Syria from the hostilities elsewhere. This also applies in a simi-
lar manner to the areas settled by the Druze minority. 
24 Denis McDonough, the U.S. advisor on Syria with ‘perhaps 
the closest ties to Mr. Obama’ has ‘questioned how much it 
was in America’s interest to tamp down the violence in Syria.’ 
He has ‘argued that the status quo in Syria could keep Iran 
pinned down for years’ and ‘suggested that a fight in Syria be-
80    Contextualizing the Syrian Uprising 
 80 
                                                                                                                    
tween Hezbollah and Al Qaeda would work to America’s ad-
vantage,’ according to Congressional officials (Mazzetti et al., 
2013). 
